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Germany1. Introduction
It is not just academics accepting that nodal pricing is ultimately the
most secure and efﬁcient way of operating a power system, but also
policy makers in many countries. However, one major obstacle for
implementing nodal prices, or the deﬁnition of smaller pricing zones,Conference on Energy Industry
orum, Toulouse, 5–6 June, 2014.
n, Thomas-Olivier Léautier, and
nt of Energy, Transportation,
diw.de (K. Neuhoff),
Mercator foundationwithin the
m the BMWi (German Federal
ojects SEEE (funding number
Curie International Incoming
ork Programme, as well as from
AI grant from CIDE.
. This is an open access article underis their implied distributional impacts. For instance, generators in
low-price and loads in higher-price zones might lose out with the new
pricing system. Thus, a central element for the successful implementa-
tion of nodal pricing is the parallel allocation of ﬁnancial hedges, such
as ﬁnancial transmission rights (FTRs).4 These are effectively used in
the electricity markets of the US Northeast, among other places. This
process has allowed (i) to compensate losers, and (ii) to reduce the
risk for players since they are protected against potential price impacts.
The latter point is particularly relevant since most market participants4 A FTR is deﬁned according to: i) an injection node and a withdrawal node; ii) a mega-
watt (MW)award that remains invariable for the lengthof the contract; and iii) a life term.
FTRsmight be obligations or options (see Rosellón and Kristiansen, 2013).With an obliga-
tion, the holder has the right to collect payment (when congestion takes place) or the
requirement to pay (when congestion in network occurs in the opposite direction to
originally deﬁned). The payment is determined by the difference in prices between the
injection node and the withdrawal node multiplied by the contractual MW amount. FTR
options grant only the non-negative gains to its owner since there is no charge when
congestion occurs in the opposite direction. FTRs are usually allocated through
auctions run by an independent system operator (ISO) that ensure that only feasible FTRs
are issued, so that transmission ﬂows do not violate capacity constraints in a power-ﬂow
model. For FTR obligations, Hogan (1992) and Hogan (2013) show that revenue from
congestion rents in the spot market is enough to cover all payments in the FTR contracts
(i.e, simultaneous technical feasibility implies revenue adequacy).
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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regulators, like a power-market design choice. Such risks are naturally
difﬁcult to assess.
FTRs started being implemented during the past two decades. The
technical characteristics of an electricity grid (as represented by the
Kirchhoff's laws) led economists to create markets for transmission
property rights (Hogan, 1992). FTR markets were implemented in the
northeast US power markets in the late 1990s. In other countries,
there were intense discussions on the need for congestion hedging
from transmission price risk, such as in the case of New Zealand,
where nodal prices were implemented as early as 1989. Notwithstand-
ing, the initial allocation of FTRs in a newly created nodal-price system
has, in particular, been one of themost highly disputed facets of market
liberalization processes in various countries. After all, an initial
provision of FTRs is an intricate process since it boils down to sharing
the congestion rents among the various market participants.5
In this paper, we are interested in the process of initial allocation of
FTRs in a recently restructuredmarket. In theUnited States, for instance,
the early implementation of an FTRmarket in the NYISO had to address
“grandfathered” contracts. That is, long-term hedging contracts already
in place, based on previous transmission capacity rights of utilities, that
had to be respected during the allocation of new FTRs within transfor-
mation of the system to nodal prices.6 In New Zealand, the adoption of
nodal prices dates back to 1989, but hedging contracts were not imme-
diately implemented at that time. It was not until late past decade
(NZEA, 2010) that discussions on FTR implementation took place both
at the inter- and intra-regional levels.7 In Australia, a zonal pricing sys-
tem with a complicated initial allocation of FTRs was developed. There
are continuing discussions in Australia to change to a fully nodal-
pricing scheme, which is proven to support FTR contracts more ﬁrmly,
but the implied sharing of rents among economic agents remains a
serious obstacle.8
In Europe, transmission rights between pricing zones had been
grandfathered in the form of physical transmission rights between
pricing zones (usually countries) to match commercial contractual
arrangements at the time of liberalization of the power markets. These
long-term transmission rights have been largely phased out and, as of
2014, most transmission rights between pricing zones are auctioned
for a year or other shorter time periods and transmission capacity is
allocated in implicit auctions in day-aheadmarkets. Financial transmis-
sion rights are only present in the Nordic area, but are exclusively
bilateral contractual arrangements with limited liquidity as the trans-
mission system operator does not issue transmission rights backed by
congestion revenue like in other markets. De Maere d'Aertrycke and
Smeers (2013) further analyze the potential introduction of FTRs in
the European market-coupling system (MC) and show with various
examples that FTRs would not lead to simultaneous feasibility and,
hence, would not be revenue adequate. That is, the zonal-pricing
nature of the MC system, together with the lack of real-time markets,5 One proven advantage, however, has been that through the introduction of nodal pric-
ing in liberalized markets, the overall level of network utilization increases and therefore
also the volume of FTRs that are available for allocation.
6 Adamson and Parker (2013) analyze the efﬁciency implications of the FTR auction
system in the NYISO market, and conclude that, after initial relative inefﬁciency, market
participants learned the rules, such that the forward-looking allocative efﬁciency of the
NYISO's FTR market design is now robust.
7 According to Read and Jackson (2013), such a long delay is partly explained by the
special characteristics of the New Zealand's market, which is dominated by hydro gener-
ation, a sparse network, and where reserve support is typically more important than net-
work capacity constraints. There is also a “tidal-ﬂow” nature of the New Zealander
electricity system, so that south-to-north ﬂows occur in wet years and north-to-south
ﬂows in dry years. This complicates the use of FTR obligations (Read, 2009).
8 Read (2007) proposes an intermediate alternative where all Australianmarket partic-
ipants (generators, loads, network capacity and ancillary-service providers) are selectively
exposed to nodal pricing, but provided with FTRs to hedge the risk implied. Given the
many vested interests involved, the major implementation obstacle to such a proposal is
how congestion rents would be allocated among market participants, such as between
generators and interconnector ﬂows, as well as between new and old market players.lead to lack of ﬁrmness of FTRs and thus make the ACER's foreseen
transmission-right framework guidelines unlikely.
In this paper, we explore a different (but related) issue to the one
discussed in De Maere d'Aertrycke and Smeers (2013). Namely, we
develop modeling frameworks to explore how an initial free allocation
of FTRs at the time of a transition from uniform to nodal pricing could
be designed so as to limit revenue or cost changes for generation and
load. We rely on two basic modeling frameworks. In our reference
uniform-pricing framework, generators bid prices and quantities
which are assumed to represent true costs and available capacity. The
market is then cleared in merit order, ignoring transmission constraints
and all dispatched capacity is paid a uniform price equal to the market
clearing price for the quantities cleared by the auction. Congestion
resulting from the dispatch is relieved by the system operator through
least cost re-dispatch at marginal generation costs and the load pays
the auction uniform clearing price plus an uplift socializing the total
cost of congestion relief.
In a second LMP-based market framework, the auction clears based
on transmission constrained least cost dispatch. Generators receive and
load pays locational marginal prices for the produced and consumed
energy. Congestion rents together with costs of transmission systems
are allocated to the load on a prorate basis. The second proposed ap-
proach treats the uniform pricing mechanism as a reference position
anduses FTRs to avoid deviations of costs or revenues linked to location-
al speciﬁc prices that could trigger political opposition while achieving
market efﬁciency by transitioning to a nodal pricing based dispatch.
FTRs are deﬁned as swaps between respective nodes and trading
hubs where the price is the load weighted nodal prices at load nodes.
The FTRs are allocated initially for free to generators and loads at the
respective nodes corresponding to each particular FTR subject to
simultaneous feasibility constraints limiting the issue of FTRs. FTRs
allocated to generation at high price nodes or load at low price nodes
are likely to exhibit in expectation a negative value, while FTRs allocated
to generation at low price nodes and load at high price nodes will have
in expectation a positive value.
To illustrate the basic dynamics of these two above frameworks, we
ﬁrstly apply them to a simpliﬁed three-node network, and then we ob-
tain simulated results for the German power system so as to quantify
the merits of different FTR allocation approaches. In all approaches,
the allocation remains independent from subsequent operational
choices by generation and load so as to avoid incentives to distort oper-
ation to impact allocation of FTRs. Themodeling effort is focused on the
distributional aspects, and does not quantify the impact on efﬁciency
savings or system security. The document explores the idea of awarding
point-to-point (or point-to-hub) FTRs as a mechanism for offsetting the
distributional consequences resulting from a transition from a uniform
pricing approach that hides the real cost or value of electricity to the
system at different locations (e.g. Germany) to a locational marginal
pricing (LMP) design that correctly prices electricity at according to sys-
tem cost or beneﬁt (e.g. NYISO). The point is that such a compensation
scheme facilitates transition by smoothing the distributional impact
that may be somewhat uncertain ex-ante and therefore of particular
concern for risk averse market participants. Such transfers might be
themain source of resistance to a nodal pricing regime, and by address-
ing these objections it would be politically possible to implement nodal
pricing, and gain the efﬁciency beneﬁts and enhanced system operation
security of that design.
In our three-node network, we address the optimal allocation of
FTRs—assuming that the regulator has full information across the entire
system—so as to investigate the extent that the FTR allocation may
reduce distributional impacts. However, in practice, it might be difﬁcult
to replicate an optimal allocation scheme that, for example, could
minimize the distributional impacts for changing from a uniform-
pricing system to a nodal one. In particular, how could a European
regulator agree on the necessary parameterization for a corresponding
EU power system model that would be the basis for such an optimal
10 The dual of the energy-balance constraint (Eq. (11)) provides the nodal prices.
11 Historical production refers to generation quantities realized under uniform pricing
over a speciﬁed time horizon from the past. Therefore, it is assumed that market partici-
pants cannot alter their generation in order to impact the FTR allocation. In the following
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tionmethods that could be available in practice and simulate the results
to compare across such allocation methods. More speciﬁcally, we pro-
pose and compare two alternative FTR allocation criteria: one based
on previous generation capacity and load consumption, another based
on historic generation and load in uniform pricing regime. We illustrate
the effects of each approach for a three-node stylized network, and then
carry a simulation study using an elaborate network representation of
the German electricity system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present
ourmodels for uniform pricing, nodal pricing and for the optimal alloca-
tion of FTRs. In Section 3, we compare, in a three-node network, how
different FTR allocation methods function; while in Section 4, we do
the same thing using real data from the German power market.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Optimization models
For our simulations, we specify three optimization models. The
underlying nomenclature of indices, parameters and variables is given
in Appendix A. The ﬁrst model characterizes the current German
electricity market clearing approach, with a uniformly priced national
spot market fully abstracting from physical transmission limits and a
subsequently following congestion management through curative
power plant re-dispatch (Kunz, 2013). The second model follows the
idea of nodal pricing and combines the economic dispatch of power
plants in the spot market and the optimal operation of the physical
transmission network. Both models, the uniform and nodal pricing
model, differ in the way congestion in the transmission network
is handled. The uniform pricing model relies on curative methods
(re-dispatch), whereas preventive congestion management is applied
in the nodal pricing. Finally, we specify a third optimization model
that addresses the allocation of ﬁnancial transmission rights to market
participants based on the results of the uniform and nodal pricing
market models. Herein, the feasibility and the revenue adequacy of
the FTR allocation are tested.
2.1. Uniform pricing model
2.1.1. Market clearing
The uniformpricingmodel startswith the optimization of the gener-
ation dispatch (Eq. (1)) subject solely to the energy balance of demand
and supply (Eq. (2)), and themaximumgeneration restriction (Eq. (3)).
Thus, restrictions stemming from limited transmission capacity of the
network are not taken into account, which results in a uniform price
for the entire electricity market.9
min
G
X
p;t
mcpGp;t ð1Þ
X
n
dn;t −
X
p
Gp;t −
X
n
gRESn;t ¼ 0 ð2Þ
0 ≤ Gp;t ≤ gmaxp ð3Þ
2.1.2. Congestion management
Given the optimized generation dispatch of the market clearing
model, network restrictions due to limited transmission capacity are
considered in the congestionmanagementmodel. Herein, the generation
dispatch is adjusted in order to ease overloading of transmission lines.
The congestion management model minimizes the congestion manage-
ment cost consisting of upward GpUP and downward regulation GpDOWN of
generation enumerated at their marginal cost (Eq. (4)). The approach9 The dual of the energy-balance constraint (Eq. (2)) provides such a uniform price.reﬂects the cost-based re-dispatch. Again, the energy balance (Eq. (5))
has to be ensured as well as maximum and minimum generation
restrictions (Eqs. (6) and (7)). The parameter gp reﬂects the optimized
generation of the market clearing model. Finally, the feasibility of the
transmission ﬂows is ensured in Eqs. (8) and (9) using a lossless DC
load ﬂow approach (Leuthold et al., 2012).
min
GUP ;GDOWN ;Δ
X
p;t
mcp G
UP
p;t −G
DOWN
p;t
 
ð4Þ
dn;t −
X
p ∈ A nð Þ
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 
− gRESn;t −
X
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bn;nnΔn;t ¼ 0 ð5Þ
0 ≤ GUPp;t ≤ g
max
p − gp;t ð6Þ
0 ≤ GDOWNp;t ≤ gp;t ð7Þ
X
l
hl;nΔn;t

 ≤ p
max
l ð8Þ
Δn0 ;t ¼ 0 ð9Þ
2.2. Nodal pricing
In contrast to the uniform pricing model, the nodal pricing model
combines the optimization of the generation dispatch and the transmis-
sion usage. Thus, the previously speciﬁed market clearing model of the
uniformpricingmodel is extended by transmission network restrictions
(Eqs. (8) and (9)) to form a nodal pricing approach. The model
minimizes generation costs (Eq. (10)) subject to the nodal energy
balance (Eq. (11)), generation capacity limitations (Eq. (3)), and DC
load ﬂow restrictions (Eqs. (8) and (9)). Again, losses stemming from
transmission ﬂows are neglected.10
min
G;Δ
X
p;t
mcpGp;t ð10Þ
dn;t −
X
p ∈ A nð Þ
Gp;t − gRESn;t −
X
nn
bn;nnΔn;t ¼ 0 ð11Þ
2.3. FTR allocation
In the following, we deﬁne two approaches, volume- and capacity-
based, for an initial allocation of FTR obligations. We deﬁne a reference
bus, as demand weighted average of all nodal prices, thus following
the typical deﬁnition of trading hubs in US systems. FTRs are
issued from generation nodes to the reference bus and from the
reference bus to nodes with load. As any trading relation can be hedged
with such a pair of FTRs, point-to-point FTRs are not necessary and
not considered.
As we focus on the distributional effects, we do not model any
re-trading of FTRs which would be motivated by market participants
that aim to more closely hedge exposure to congestion costs with
FTRs. Such re-trading, would under the assumption of perfect
competition, not have a distributional impact.
The ﬁrst approach allocates FTRs to conventional (FTRpG) and
renewable (FTRnRES) generators based on historical production11calculations, we use the generation quantities of the uniform pricing setting for the FTR
allocation.
Table 1
Summary of market participant's revenue, costs, and surplus in different pricing regimes
in EUR.
Uniform
pricing
Nodal
pricing
Surplus change including
socialized transmission surplus
Load
n2
Revenue 0 0 –
Costs 3800 2600 –
Surplus −3800 −2600 +2200
n3
Revenue 0 0 –
Costs 7600 7800 –
Surplus −7600 −7800 +1800
Generation
p1
Revenue 6150 2150 –
Costs 2150 2150 –
Surplus 4000 0 −4000
p3
Revenue 5250 5250 –
Costs 5250 5250 –
Surplus 0 0 0
Transmission
Revenue 1350 3000 –
Cost 4050 0 –
Surplus −2700 3000 Socialized to load
179F. Kunz et al. / Energy Economics 60 (2016) 176–185(volume-based approach), whereas the second approach relies
on installed generation capacities (capacity-based approach) to
determine the amount of FTRs. These measures are applied for the
allocation of FTRs to conventional and renewable generation. On
the demand side, FTRs (FTRnD) are allocated relative to consumption,
given the total amount of FTRs allocated to generation. For both
allocation approaches, we explore different levels or amounts of
total FTRs, ranging from 0% to 100% of historical generation or
installed capacity, respectively.
For each allocation approach, the feasibility as well as the revenue
adequacy is checked. Feasibility means that FTR allocation is possible
with the underlying physical transmission network and its capacities
(Eqs. (8), (9), (12), and (13)). On the other hand, revenue adequacy
requires that thepayments resulting fromFTRobligationsdonot exceed
the congestion rent crtTSOearned by the TSO (Eq. (14)). If the initial
allocation is feasible in these terms, the implications for the market
participant's surplus are quantiﬁed as additional revenues stemming
from holding an FTR due to nodal price differences. The price at the
reference bus priceslack,t where all FTRs are related to is deﬁned as the
demand weighted average of all nodal prices.
X
n
FTRDn −
X
n
FTRRESn −
X
p
FTRGp ¼ 0 ð12Þ
FTRDn − FTR
RES
n −
X
p ∈ A nð Þ
FTRGp −
X
nn
bn;nnΔn;t ¼ 0 ð13Þ
crTSOt −
X
p
priceslack;t − priceA nð Þ;t
 
FTRGp −
X
n
priceslack;t − pricen;t
 
FTRRESn
−
X
n
pricen;t − priceslack;t
 
FTRDn ¼ 0 ð14Þ
3. FTR allocation in a three-node network
In a ﬁrst step, we consider a simple three-node network setting in
order to examine the implications of the different initial FTR allocation
approaches on the differentmarket participants. Generally, we consider
two time steps reﬂecting off-peak and peak load, two conventional
generators with different marginal generation cost, as well as two load
locations. The underlying transmission infrastructure is characterized
by equal technical characteristics and only one particular line has
limited capacity. The setting is summarized in Fig. 1.
Table 1 depicts the surplus of the consideredmarket participants for
the uniform and the nodal pricing regime. Due to the different ways to
manage network constraints, market prices differ and, hence, so does
the surplus of load and generation. Furthermore, the transmission
part faces congestion management costs with respect to the uniform
pricing when shifting production from cheap to expensive generationFig. 1. Three-node network setting with two time periods (t1,t2), symmetric resistance of
lines and a transmission constraint of 50 MW on line 13.assets in order to correct for violations of the transmission constraints
(re-dispatch) and revenues in the nodal pricing stemming from an
implicit allocation of network capacity. Further on, we assume in a
ﬁrst step that the transmission surplus is redistributed or socialized to
load as part of the network tariffs.12 Thus, loads at nodes 1 and 2 are
left with an overall beneﬁt of 2200 EUR and 1800 EUR, respectively.
On the other hand, generation p1 is negatively affected and faces a
loss in surplus by−4000 EUR for the two considered time periods.
So far,wehave considered a full redistribution of transmission surplus
to load, which results in overall proﬁts for load. In the following, we relax
this assumption and apply an initial FTR allocation that allocates trans-
mission surplus, in particular the congestion rent of the nodal pricing,
to allmarket participants; including generators. Fig. 2 depicts the implica-
tions of an increased amount of FTRs allocated to market participants
based on either their installed capacity or the historical production of
the uniform pricing regime. If not all congestion rent is allocated through
FTRs, the remaining rent is again socialized to load. The allocation is un-
dertaken as long as the feasibility of the FTR allocation is ensured.
As seen in Fig. 2, both allocation approaches initiate a redistribution
of congestion rents and bring down the loss or proﬁt through a pricing
change for most market participants. This is particularly true for the
volume-based allocation where the loss experienced by generation is
nearly compensated. On the other hand, the initial gain of load is
decreased and redistributed to generation. If we instead consider an
allocation of FTRs based on installed capacity, the general result remains
true. The peak generator located at n3 obtains more FTRs with capacity
based allocation than in the allocation based on historic (modeled)
production. As the price at n3 is higher than at the reference node, the
allocation of the FTR requires payments from the FTR holder, hence
the declining surplus of the peak generation at n3.
If we adjust the optimization problem described in Section 2.3 to
minimize the absolute difference between surpluses of both pricing
regimes, we can easily determine an optimal initial FTR allocation that
minimizes the surplus variance.13 Within this approach, the FTR12 The transmission surplus is socialized to load in each node according to their share on
the entire load. Furthermore, the distribution of transmission surplus solely to load instead
of generation or a combination of both reﬂects the current approach of most European
countries.
13 See Appendix A for the detailed model formulation.
Fig. 2. Change of market participant's surplus between uniform and nodal pricing considering different initial FTR allocation regimes in the three-node setting.
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optimized with respect to the deﬁned objective. Using this setting, an
optimized FTR allocation is determined, which allocates 75 MW FTRs
to generation located at node n1 and load located at node n3. All other
market players donot receive an FTR.With this FTR allocation, the initial
loss of generation at node n1 of−4000 EUR can be reduced to−1500
EUR, while the signiﬁcant positive surplus of load, taking the socialized
congestion rent into account, is reduced.
An intriguing result from the exercise was for us, the choice of the
reference point for ﬁnancial contracts matters. In order to avoid the
need to issue FTRs between each pair of nodes, typically a reference
node orweighted set of nodes (reference hub) is deﬁned.Market partic-
ipants thus require only FTRs to and from each node to the hub. Market
participants with a FTR from the origin of a power transfer to the hub,
and a subsequent FTR from the hub to the destination, are indifferent
to the deﬁnition of the hub. However, if the initial free FTR allocation
is for contracts from the location of load/generation to the reference lo-
cation (node or hub) only, then the deﬁnition of the hub matters. To
minimize the effect, the reference location of FTRs should reﬂect aver-
age rather than extreme prices and location (see Olmos and Neuhoff
(2006) for a similar calculation at European level).
Real networks, generation and load patterns are obviously far more
complex than our three-node example. The large number of nodes and
linkages could—in principle—moderate the impact of any one constraint,
and thus reduce some of the large variations that are demonstrated for
the three-node network, thus enhancing the value of FTRs to address dis-
tributional impacts of nodal pricing implementation. On the contrary, the
speciﬁc circumstances of nodes, generation and load could reduce the
value of using FTRs to address distributional impacts. To assess this
trade-off, we quantify the role of FTR allocation proportional to annual
generation/load and proportional to installed generation capacity/peak
load in the following application to the German power system.4. FTR allocation for the German power system
In a second analysis, we apply the described methodology to a
dataset reﬂecting the 2012 German power system. A detailed descrip-
tion of the dataset and the underlying data sources is provided in
Egerer et al. (2014).14 The dataset covers an entire year, but we focus
on three characteristic weeks to limit computational requirements.
Theweeks are selected due to their different load and renewable gener-
ation pattern: one covering a summer week with high solar generation
and two covering winter weeks that are characterized by high load and
low or high wind generation, respectively. For these three weeks, we14 The original dataset and a basic formulation of the underlying ELMOD model can be
derived from http://www.diw.de/elmod.determine the uniform and nodal pricing solution, both for the
off-peak and the peak periods, as well as apply the different FTR
allocation approaches.
In the following, the implications on load, conventional and renew-
able generation are analyzed in detail. First, the absolute changes in
surplus between nodal and uniform pricing are shown in Fig. 3 for the
three analyzed weeks. The transmission congestion costs occurring in
the uniform pricing due to necessary re-dispatch of generation as well
as the transmission congestion rent of the nodal pricing are socialized
to load as in the three-node setting. Thus, they are implicitly considered
in the results and, therefore, not listed explicitly in the following graphs.
As seen in Fig. 3, the changes are signiﬁcant in winter weeks with a
signiﬁcant amount of network congestion. In the summer weeks, the
congestion is low and therefore both pricing regimes yield nearly iden-
tical results. In particular, demand wins in all three cases from a switch
to nodal pricing as, ﬁrstly, the price level decreases due to explicit
pricing of network congestion and, secondly, the socialization of con-
gestion rents in the nodal pricing regime to electrical load. On the
other hand, the lower price level decreases the generation revenues in
all three cases. In particular, the last case, with high wind generation
in the winter week, indicates greater losses for renewable generation
than other cases. Due to high wind generation in the northern part of
Germany, signiﬁcant congestion occurs on the north–south corridor
resulting in lower prices in the northern part of Germany and higher
prices in the southern part compared to the uniform pricing. As most of
the conventional as well as renewable generation is located in the
northern part, this results in a negative effect of nodal pricing for genera-
tion. Furthermore, the congestion and, henceforth, congestion rentsFig. 3. Change of surplus between uniform and nodal pricing.
Fig. 4.Change ofmarket participant's surplus between uniformand nodal pricing considering different initial FTR allocation regimes (light gray: load; gray: conventional generation; black:
renewable generation).
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pared to the uniform pricing regime. It is important to note that the
level of congestion in the German power system is relatively low. For in-
stance, in the winter weekwith highwind generation, congestion rent in
the nodal pricing amounts to 1.6 mEUR or 0.2% of electricity cost for
demand.15
Comparing the different FTR allocation approaches, Fig. 4 depicts the
surplus changes for the capacity-based (left side) and the volume-based
allocation approach (right side) for the three weeks considered.
Furthermore, each graph visualizes the implications for an increasing
amount of FTRs to be allocated as long as the FTR allocation remains
feasible. Thus, on the Y-axis in each graph, no FTRs are allocated,
which reﬂects the initial situation as shown in Fig. 3, whereas on the
X-axis in each graph, the FTRs to be allocated to market participants
are represented up to their maximum feasible value. Furthermore, it is15 Electricity cost of demand amount to 675 mEUR in the windy winter week. It
represents the sum of hourly nodal load times nodal price. Thus, it can be interpreted as
market volume.important to note, that the distribution of FTRs differs for each week
in the volume-based approach as the uniform pricing production in
the week is used as distribution measure. For the capacity-based
approach the distribution is constant as the installed generation
capacities are the same.
Fig. 4 shows that both FTR distribution approaches yield qualitative-
ly comparable results. The FTR allocation yields the expected beneﬁt of
reducing the distributional impact of the introduction of nodal pricing.
The calculations also illustrate that both allocation regimes can only
reduce the changes in surplus, but cannot precisely compensate allmar-
ket participants. Comparing both allocation regimes, the volume-based
approach achieves a favorable distribution for all three weeks.16 This
can be attributed to the fact that the generation of the uniform pricing
regime is taken as proxy for FTR allocation and thus varies between16 We focus our analysis on replicating existing distributions of the uniform pricing set-
ting. Therefore, surplus changes of all market participants are considered equally. Alterna-
tively,minimizing surplus changes orﬁnal costs for speciﬁcmarket participants (e.g. load)
are other options to select favorable allocation schemes.
Fig. 5. Average change in surplus of demand in the high-wind winter week under volume-based allocation approach.
182 F. Kunz et al. / Energy Economics 60 (2016) 176–185the three weeks. Thus, the low production of renewable generation in
the ﬁrst winter week is considered in the FTR allocation yielding in a
higher allocation to conventional generation. In contrast, the share of
FTRs allocated to renewable generation in the windy winter week is
higher than conventional generation due to a higher production share.
The FTR allocation in the capacity-based approach is, by deﬁnition, con-
stant for all three weeks. Thus, if renewable production is low and the
price at the nodes of renewable generation is below the reference
value (e.g. because of large conventional generation), the negative
value of FTRs reduces the surplus.17 The scale of the overall effect is
small, but illustrates the challenge of using FTR obligations to hedge
the output of intermittent renewable sources. FTR options would, in
principle, avoid negative payments, but do not allow for netting as in
the case of FTR obligations and thus reduce the volume of obligations
that can be allocated.
Additionally, as both regionally diversiﬁed generation and load
structure characterize the German power system, a closer look at the
regional level is necessary in order to analyze the effectiveness of the
allocation regimes. On an aggregated level, as presented here, the
results are promising and may provide an argument to switch from
the pricing regime toward nodal pricing.
In the following, we analyze the results at the regional level for load,
conventional, and renewable generation. We focus our analysis on the
winter weekwith highwind as it shows the greatest level of congestion
among all considered weeks. Fig. 5 depicts the average change of
demand's surplus at the regional level, differentiated between the initial
situation without any FTR allocation (left side) and the situation with
full volume-based FTR allocation (right side). As shown, congestion
within the transmission network divides Germany into two parts: an17 As renewable generation faces costs from FTR obligations, the congestion rent
increases accordingly. Through socialization of the remaining congestion rent (initial
congestion rent minus cost from FTR obligations), demand faces a positive effect in the
winter week with low wind.export constrained north-eastern part with lower average prices and
an import-constrained south-western part with higher average prices.
This development could be somewhat altered should solar deployment
volumes in the south increase.
Henceforth, demand in the export-constrained region proﬁts from
lower electricity prices, whereas other regions face higher electricity
costs and lose from a change in the pricing regime. Through an
allocation of FTRs, as depicted on the right side of Fig. 5, demand in
south-western Germany is compensated for the loss and vice versa for
the beneﬁts in north-eastern part. Through the allocation of FTRs, the
changes in surplus resulting from the introduction of nodal pricing is
signiﬁcantly reduced.
To assess this effect in greater detail, Figs. 6 and 7 depict histograms
of average surplus changes, differentiated by market participants
considered. Fig. 6 presents the initial situation, which is characterized
by high variations of participant's surpluses; in particular of demand
and renewable generation.Fig. 6.Histogram of average nodal surplus changes in the high-windwinterweekwithout
FTR allocation.
Fig. 7. Histogram of average nodal surplus changes in the high-wind winter week with capacity-based (left side) and volume-based FTR allocation (right side).
183F. Kunz et al. / Energy Economics 60 (2016) 176–185As shown in Fig. 7, the demand side with the allocation of FTRs can
compensate for the surplus changes, thus mitigating the impact of
introducing nodal pricing under either allocation methodology.
In the case of generation (both renewable and conventional), an
allocation based on installed capacity can result in instances of
signiﬁcant increase or decrease of surplus (exceeding 2 Euro/MWh).
This happens when generation is located at nodes with signiﬁcant
price changes and at the same time production volume is signiﬁcantly
below installed capacity. Thus, the effect only occurs in the capacity-
based allocation method. Furthermore, the effect is linked to speciﬁc
network circumstances: one generator in a generation pocket. Thus,
we need to further assess the numerical results to assess to what extent
this effect is material or a result of model calibration so as to inform a
debate about implications for allocation methodologies or other issues,
such as local market power mitigation procedures.
However, practically, wind power output will deviate in any hour
from historic production volumes and, therefore, additional (hourly)
variations must be anticipated, which will not necessarily balance out
across the year. This again points to the difﬁculties of using FTR
obligations as hedging instruments for wind power generation.
Fig. 8 depicts the standarddeviation of surplus changes as a function of
the volume of FTR allocation. It conﬁrms the point that for demand and
conventional generation, the allocation of FTRs can reduce most of the
surplus change linked to the introduction of nodal pricing. It also
illustrates that in case of conventional generation, the maximum alloca-
tion of FTRs results in an overcompensation of generation and, thus, the
optimal volume of FTR allocation is below the maximum possible
allocation. This result is linked to the use of FTR obligations that allowFig. 8. Standard deviation ofmarket participant's surplus in volume-based approach in the
high-wind winter week (based on demand and generation at each node).for netting and, consequently, for a larger overall volume of FTRs to
be allocated.
For renewable generation assets, the allocation of FTR obligations
reduces only about half the standard deviation of surplus changes linked
to nodal pricing introduction. Instead, if FTR options were allocated,
then the allocation can only increase and not decrease the surplus. It
also would result in a signiﬁcantly lower volume of FTRs available
for allocation, as netting is not possible, thus reducing the ability to
compensate any of the market participants.
The presented analysis is based on twomain assumptions which are
of relevance in the context of FTRs. First, we fully abstract in our current
modeling setting from transmission losses as we assume a lossless DC
load ﬂow approach. Accounting for transmission losses impacts in par-
ticular the locational prices in the nodal pricing system and thus can
have implications on the effectiveness of the FTR allocation. Harvey
and Hogan (2002) describe different design options for deﬁning FTRs
to hedge transmission losses. As we neglect transmission losses in the
FTR allocation, revenue adequacymay be violated and the transmission
system operator would face additional costs for compensating these
transmission losses.Within our setting, these costs could then be social-
ized through network charges as it is currently applied in the German
market. However, future research could extend our modeling setting
by transmission losses as abstracting from transmission losses in a
nodal pricing system may also impact the efﬁciency of the dispatch.
Secondly, we assume a ﬁxed network topology and neglect any
unavailability of transmission assets through, e.g. contingencies. Such
unavailabilities would yield a derated transmission capacity and may
violate the revenue adequacy of the FTR allocation. Thus, the transmis-
sion system operator is left with an imbalance of FTR revenues and
costs. While this creates incentives for TSOs to schedule transmission
maintenance at times of low congestion levels and to execute mainte-
nance quickly, the associated risks may increase ﬁnancing costs for
TSOs. In the German system, the revenue shortfall could also be social-
ized through network charges as it is currently applied for congestion
costs in the uniform pricing regime.18
Furthermore, our results and modeling approach rely on a perfectly
competitive electricity market and we abstract from any strategic
behavior of market participants. Strategic behavior can be present in
the uniform pricing settingwith a subsequent congestionmanagement.18 Hogan et al. (2010) additionally point out that a normal security-constrained, eco-
nomic dispatch in electricity markets identiﬁes in advance monitored contingencies and
applies “n-1” limits so that the actual dispatch would remain feasible in the event of any
of the monitored contingencies. Hence, for such contingencies, there is no dichotomy be-
tween normal dispatch and the contingency constrained dispatch. Normal “congestion”
costs include the economic cost associated with the contingency. That is, all economic
costs are congestion costs covered by the FTRs.
184 F. Kunz et al. / Energy Economics 60 (2016) 176–185If congestionmanagement capacities are contracted through a separate
bid- or market-based approach, incentives exist to proﬁtably deviate
from a competitive behavior in the congestion management market.
In the context of the presented volume-based FTR allocation, market
participants could then alter their behavior strategically to impact
the FTR allocation. However, congestion management capacities in
Germany are not contracted through a separate market but they are
rather administratively required to participate in the congestion
management and thus incentives for strategic behavior are rather
limited.19 This assumptionmaynot be valid for othermarkets or regions
and may reduce the effectiveness of the proposed FTR allocations.
Further work is therefore needed to better explore the effectiveness
in other regions and alternative FTR designs. The current application
and the identiﬁed effects of the proposed FTR allocations are evaluated
for the German system and an extension to other regions with differing
spatial and technological characteristics is needed to verify the
robustness of the achieved results. Regarding alternative FTR designs,
these could involve splitting of FTR options so as to, for example,
compensate renewable generation for the price difference up to a strike
price at the reference node (Newbery and Neuhoff, 2008; Biggar and
Hesamzadeh, 2013).
As of 2015, a more pragmatic solution is prominent in the US. Utility
companies run tenders for renewable generation that offer a long-term
off-take contract at the node of the generation asset. In selecting the
winning bidder the utilities can consider congestion costs for delivering
the energy to their customers, thus contributing to efﬁcient locational
choices, while the transmission price risk is pooled within a larger
portfolio of utility and not imposed on project ﬁnanced renewable
projects. Feed-in tariffs typically offer a similar long-term off-take
contract at the point of production, thus avoiding exposure of renew-
able projects to locational price risks. A new paradigm suggests that
such feed-in tariffs should be replaced by (ﬂoating) market premium
systems. Floating premiums provide a payment between an average
system price and a strike price, but leave the renewable project investor
exposed to any congestion risk linked to introduction of zonal or nodal
pricing. This was not considered to be a relevant risk by the proponents
of such a transition as they typically assume the feasibility of a single
pricing zone at country level or beyond.5. Conclusions
A major challenge for the adjustment of pricing zones and for the
implementation of nodal pricing is the distributional impact of price
changes facing generation and load in different locations of the system.
The sum of changes to proﬁts by individual generators and changes to
costs faced by individual load of the price changes are typically several
times higher than the efﬁciency savings delivered by an efﬁcient
congestion pricing mechanism while the beneﬁts of such a change
with respect to more reliable system operation are usually not ex-ante
monetized.
In order to ensure that all (ormost) parties beneﬁt from and support
the initial shift to an improved congestion management system before
system security risks of inappropriate congestion management become
apparent, it may be considered to mitigate the distributional impact.
This may built on the experience that the implementation of nodal
pricing is often accompanied with the free allocation of FTRs to market
participants in proportion to their prevailing trading relationships
(contracts or transfers within vertically integrated utilities) with the
objective of mitigating the distributional impact. However, as in the
European context most long-term contracting arrangements between19 Generation capacities with a capacity above 10 MW are required to be available for
congestion management depending on their spot market commitments. Furthermore,
the compensation of generators for positive redispatch and the payments from generators
for negative redispatch are based on historical spot market prices to proxy generation
costs.generation and load have expired, the FTR allocation would have to be
based on some other methodology instead.
Given the very political nature of rent allocation, the allocation
methodology would have to be clearly speciﬁed and transparent. The
purpose of this paper is to explore possible allocation alternatives,
their representation in numerical models and their relative merits
based from the model results.
In a three-node network, we ﬁnd that allocation in proportion to
historic annual production volume allows for better compensation of
the distributional impact than allocation in proportion to installed
capacity. This effect is dominated by the large discrepancy between avail-
able and used capacity of one generator in our stylized model. Further-
more, this highlights that the spatial and technological characteristics of
the electricity system severely impact the effectiveness of the FTR
allocations.
Hence, we explore the situation in a more realistic setting, modeling
the FTR allocation for the German power system based on full nodal
representation capturing its spatial and technological characteristics.
For these speciﬁc circumstances, our results show that FTR allocation
can mitigate almost all distributional effects for the demand side and a
large share of the distributional effects for conventional generation.
For intermittent renewables, the allocation of FTR obligations can
mitigate fewer of the distributional effects, as the allocation proﬁle
will not match generation and could, at times, also increase the surplus
change linked to the introduction of nodal pricing. This points to
the need of either more complex FTR designs (option contracts),
contractual arrangements (long-term off-take contracts) or legal
frameworks (ﬁxed feed-in tariffs) that insulate revenue streams from
the introduction of additional zones or nodal pricing.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.09.018.
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